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This paper re-examines a counterintuitive corollary of utilitarianism under unequal longevities: 
the tendency to redistribute resources from short-lived towards long-lived agents, against any 
intuition of compensation. It is shown that this corollary prevails not only under time-additive 
lifetime  welfare,  but,  also,  in  general,  under  non-additive  lifetime  welfare,  so  that  this 
counterintuitive redistributive corollary is a robust argument against utilitarianism. This paper 
studies a remedy to that counterintuitive corollary. This consists in imputing, when solving the 
social planner's problem, the consumption equivalent of a long life to the consumption of long-
lived  agents.  We  identify  the  conditions  under  which  such  a  modified  utilitarian  optimum 
involves a compensation of short-lived agents with respect to the laissez-faire. That remedy is 
also applied to an economy with risky longevity, where short-lived agents are penalized not only 
by the limited opportunities to spread resources over time (due to a shorter life), but, also, by lost 
savings (due to unanticipated death). 
 
Keywords:  utilitarianism,  differential  longevity,  compensation,  redistribution,  consumption 
equivalent. 
JEL Classification: D63, I12, I18, J18 
 
                                                           
1 Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. E-mail: marie-
louise.leroux@uclouvain.be 
2 Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, and Paris School of Economics, F-75014 Paris, France.  
E-mail: Gregory.ponthiere@ens.fr 
The authors would like to thank David de la Croix, Louis Eeckhoudt, Marc Fleurbaey, Thibault Gajdos, 
François Maniquet, André Masson, Patrick Moyes, Pierre Pestieau, Erik Schokkaert, Luigi Siciliani, Salvador 
Valdes-Prieto and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on this paper. 
This paper presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction initiated by 
the  Belgian  State,  Prime  Minister's  Office,  Science  Policy  Programming.  The  scientific  responsibility  is 
assumed by the authors. 1 Introduction
Although widely used by taxation theorists, utilitarianism exhibits nonetheless a quite coun-
terintuitive corollary in the particular context of unequal longevities. Actually, under stan-
dard assumptions such as the expected utility hypothesis and additive lifetime welfare,
utilitarianism recommends nothing less than the redistribution of resources from short-lived
agents to long-lived agents.
That corollary, which contradicts any intuition of compensation, can be explained as
follows. Take the simple case of deterministic longevities varying across agents. Under
time-additive lifetime welfare, a utilitarian social planner can hardly distinguish between,
on the one hand, one life of x periods, and, on the other hand, x lives of one period.1
Hence, provided Gossen￿ s First Law (1854) - i.e. the law of declining marginal utility of
consumption per period - holds, it is always optimal, for a utilitarian planner, to give the
same consumption per period to all agents, whatever their length of life is. As a consequence,
long-lived agents do not only live longer: they bene￿t also, at the social optimum, from more
resources. Hence, provided living long is a good thing (or, at least, not a bad thing per se),
short-lived people are penalized twice: once by Nature and once by Bentham.2
This double penalization is quite counterintuitive, especially when longevity di⁄erentials
are exogenous. Clearly, in that case, one would like short-lived agents to be compensated for
their short life, as they cannot be regarded as responsible for this. Note that the intuition for
compensation may also be strong even when longevity di⁄erentials are partly endogenous.
For instance, shorter lives due to a strong taste for sin goods, or a large disutility from
physical activity may be also regarded as caused by factors that are exogenous to the agent,
and, as such, which would support some compensation.
Classical utilitarianism can hardly do justice to such intuitions. All this does not really
come as a surprise: as shown by Mirrlees (1982), utilitarianism can, at best, serve as an
ethical standard in the special case of a society of identical individuals, because, in that case,
the totality of all individuals can be regarded as a single individual. However, once some
heterogeneity is introduced in the fundamentals (e.g. preferences, handicap, etc.), utilitari-
1For simplicity, we abstract here from pure time preferences. Natural discounting through survival
probabilities is discussed in the second part of the paper.
2As this is well-known, the classical utilitarian doctrine was ￿rst stated by Jeremy Bentham (1789).
Note, however, that the principle of the largest happiness for the largest number can also be found in the
earlier writings of Cessare Beccaria (1764) on the most desirable laws and institutions for justice.
2anism can only be used as a useful approximation, and may lead to counterintuitive results.3
Given that a variation in the length of life can hardly be regarded as non-fundamental, it is
not surprising that utilitarianism yields here some counterintuitive consequences.
But even if the di¢ culties faced by classical utilitarianism under longevity di⁄erentials
could be expected, this leaves us nonetheless with a quite uncomfortable position. The ori-
gin of this discomfort lies in the universality of longevity di⁄erentials. Actually, as shown
by demographers, longevity di⁄erentials within a given cohort have always been large, and
remain signi￿cant today. For instance, according to the United Nations Development Pro-
gram (2008), the life expectancy of women is, in the U.S., about 5.2 years larger than the
one for men in 2007 (80.4 years against 75.2). There exist also large disparities in sur-
vival conditions according to the education, the income, the ethnicity, and the employment
status.4 Hence, if the mere existence of longevity di⁄erentials su¢ ces to reject the use of
classical utilitarianism, there remains little room for using that ethical doctrine.
Should we then abandon utilitarianism when considering policy discussions in which
agents have unequal lengths of life, that is, in almost all policy issues? Whereas one may be
tempted to answer a¢ rmatively, it should be stressed that various solutions can be brought,
in order to keep the utilitarian framework, but without the undesirable redistribution from
short-lived to long-lived agents.
A ￿rst solution consists in relaxing the assumption of additive lifetime welfare, and
in representing lifetime utility by a concave transform of the sum of temporal utilities.
That solution, proposed by Bommier (2006) and Bommier et al (2009, 2010), introduces a
distinction between one life of x periods and x lives of one period, so that a utilitarian planner
is less likely to redistribute from the short-lived to the long-lived. Another solution, explored
in Leroux and Ponthiere (2009), consists in relaxing the expected utility hypothesis, which
is another way to avoid the double penalization. However, those approaches, which rely
on complex representations of individual preferences, do not lead to analytically tractable
solutions, neither at the laissez-faire, nor at the ￿rst-best. Moreover, it is far from obvious
that those solutions su¢ ce to save utilitarianism from counterintuitive redistribution.
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we examine the conditions under which utilitari-
anism exhibits the undesirable tendency of redistributing resources from short-lived towards
3For instance, Arrow (1971) and Sen (1973) showed that, given that a handicaped person is likely to have
a lower marginal utility of consumption than other persons, utilitarianism would give him fewer resources
than to much better o⁄ persons, which is quite paradoxical.
4See Rogot et al (1992).
3long-lived agents. Then, having shown the generality of those conditions, as well as the roots
of the problem, we shall propose our own "remedy", and apply it to utilitarianism.
It follows from those two goals that the present study will remain entirely in the utilitar-
ian tradition. Note that our exclusive focus on utilitarianism does not reveal any adherence
to its foundations, whose ethical plausibility has been largely questioned.5 On the contrary,
our emphasis on utilitarianism is due to the large popularity of that ethical doctrine in
the ￿eld of optimal taxation. That large popularity, taken jointly with the counterintuitive
results implied by that doctrine under unequal longevities, provides the major motivation
for this work.6 Having stressed this, let us now brie￿ y present our study in more details.
To study the conditions under which utilitarianism redistributes from short-lived towards
long-lived agents, we shall ￿rst concentrate on a two-period model with unequal deterministic
longevities. In that model, all agents know the date of their death, but there can be a
large welfare loss due to a shorter life. Provided the (exogenous) endowment of agents
is su¢ ciently large, there exists a welfare loss resulting from the limited opportunity of
short-lived agents to spread their endowment over time (because of Gossen￿ s First Law).
Moreover, in order to isolate the exact role played by the form of lifetime welfare, we shall
assume that lifetime welfare can take either a standard time-additive form, or can be a
concave transform of the sum of temporal utilities. Comparing the laissez-faire equilibrium
with the utilitarian optimum will then allow us to show that assuming non-additive lifetime
welfare does not, in general, su¢ ce to avoid the counterintuitive redistribution from short-
lived towards long-lived agents. The reason why this is so lies in the fact that the utilitarian
planner, in his problem, does not take into account a fundamental source of injustice among
agents, namely that a given amount of consumption does not have the same capacity to
produce welfare across agents with unequal longevities.7 Actually, provided one forgets
that source of injustice, the concavity of temporal welfare tends to favour an equalization of
consumption per period, and the non-additive nature of lifetime welfare can only play against
5By utilitarianism, we mean an ethical doctrine based on welfarism, sum-ranking and consequentialism.
See Sen and Williams (1982) on the critique of those three pillars.
6By remaining in the utilitarian tradition, the present study di⁄ers from ethical frameworks relying on a
broader informational basis (e.g. primary goods, functionings), on an non-aggregative objective (e.g. max-
imin), and paying attention to the relation between means and ends (e.g. responsibility-based approaches).
The study of those alternative frameworks under unequal longevities is left for future research.
7In some sense, Gossen￿ s First Law makes short-lived agents like handicapped persons, who can only
reach, in comparison with long-lived agents, a lower lifetime welfare level from a given amount of resources.
The introduction of non-additive lifetime welfare tends to mitigate the welfare gap between short-lived and
long-lived agents, but can hardly make that gap disappear completely.
4that tendency, but not eradicate it.8 Therefore that undesirable redistribution constitutes
a quite robust argument against utilitarianism in the context of unequal longevities.
Given that this counterintuitive feature of utilitarianism comes from its neglect of a cause
of injustice (the unequal capacities of consumptions to generate welfare across short-lived
and long-lived agents), a natural "remedy" to that problem consists in the addition, to the
social planner￿ s problem, of compensation contraints. Those constraints account for the fact
that consuming a given amount of resources when being short-lived or when being long-lived
are, in general, not equivalent in welfare terms. In short, those constraints de￿ne homog-
enized consumptions for short-lived and long-lived agents, by counting the consumption
equivalent of a long life as part of the consumption of long-lived agents.9 The underlying
idea is that this consumption equivalent is a measure of the advantage of the long-lived, and
should be counted as such. The remedy, which can be called "compensation-constrained
utilitarianism", consists then of solving a modi￿ed social planning problem where all con-
sumptions - either of short-lived or of long-lived agents -, are homogenized by the above
procedure. Homogenizing consumptions has crucial consequences on redistribution. By
introducing the consumption equivalent of a long life in the social planner￿ s problem, the
undesirable redistribution from short-lived to long-lived agents is contradicted, and may
even be turned into a redistribution from long-lived to short-lived agents.
This paper aims at examining under which conditions that remedy allows the com-
pensation of short-lived agents or, at least, reduces the - counterintuitive - transfers from
short-lived to long-lived agents. For that purpose, we will ￿rst contrast the compensation-
constrained utilitarian optimum with the laissez-faire and the standard utilitarian optimum
in the basic two-period model with deterministic longevities. Then, for the sake of gener-
ality, we will consider a more general framework, where longevity is risky, by introducing a
probability of survival from the ￿rst to the second period of life. The introduction of risky
longevity allows us to identify two distinct welfare costs from a shorter life. On the one
hand, short-lived agents su⁄er, as under deterministic longevities, from reduced opportuni-
ties to spread their endowment over time. On the other hand, the presence of risk brings an
additional welfare loss, since some savings are lost as a result of unanticipated death. That
second welfare loss exacerbates the disadvantage of short-lived agents, and invites a larger
8However, the extent of counterintuitive redistribution depends on the form of lifetime welfare (see below).
9That remedy is close to what Broome (2004) proposes in his attempt to account for the value of longevity
in a utilitarian framework, but in a goods metrics (and not utility metrics).
5compensation. Here again, utilitarianism can hardly provide such a compensation, making
a remedy even more needed. Note, however, that the presence of risk, by preventing the
identi￿cation of long-lived agents ex ante, complicates also the task of the social planner,
who must deal with ex ante unobservable heterogeneity.
Finally, it is also important, at this stage, to show how this paper relates to the existing
literature. Actually, this paper makes a bridge between two literatures, which, as far as we
know, have remained largely unconnected despite a common focus on longevity and welfare.
The ￿rst literature, to which we refered above, focused on the optimal tax-transfer
policy under unequal longevities. Bommier (2006) and Bommier et al (2009, 2010) studied,
in the context of unequal longevities, the optimal redistribution in a utilitarian framework.
However, those papers did not identify the conditions under which long-lived agents are
better o⁄ than short-lived agents at the laissez-faire. This constitutes the ￿rst task of
the present paper. Moreover, those previous works highlight that concavifying the sum
of temporal utilities may reduce the tendency of utilitarianism to redistribute towards the
long-lived, but without identifying the conditions under which compensation takes place.
The present study will pay a particular attention to that issue, which serves as a starting
point for proposing a remedy against utilitarianism￿ s undesirable redistributive corollaries.
The second branch of the literature to which this paper is related consists of the applied
welfare analysis on the valuation of longevity di⁄erentials across time and space. Since
Usher￿ s (1973) pioneer calculation of the consumption-equivalent of a longer life on the
basis of empirical estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL), various empirical studies
have studied the monetization of longevity gains (see Nordhaus, 2003; Becker et al, 2005).
However, while those studies were highly informative about how to measure the progress of
societies, their major output - i.e. the empirical estimates of consumption-equivalents of a
long life - remained largely unexploited. The present study shows how those estimates can
be used to homogenize consumptions across agents having di⁄erent longevities, and, then,
how the so-modi￿ed utilitarian problem can lead to a more intuitive allocation of resources.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the standard utilitarian redistrib-
ution problem under unequal longevities, in the cases of additive and non-additive lifetime
welfare. Section 3 introduces the remedy, and contrasts the modi￿ed ￿rst-best with the
standard utilitarian optimum. Section 4 examines how the remedy can be applied under
risky longevity. Numerical illustrations are given in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
62 The basic model: deterministic longevity
Let us ￿rst consider the standard utilitarian problem of redistribution under di⁄erential
longevities. For that purpose, we shall consider here two types of agents, i = 1;2, with
di⁄erent longevities. Type-1 agents live one period (of length normalized to 1), while type-2
agents live two periods. For simplicity, we shall, without loss of generality, assume that
there exists one member within each of those groups.
As usually assumed in the literature, the utility of death is ￿xed to zero. However, the
lifetime welfare is here assumed to have a more general form than the standard time-additive














where ci and di are ￿rst- and second-period consumptions for agent i = 1;2, u(￿) is the
standard temporal utility of consumption (with u0(￿) > 0 and u00(￿) < 0), and G(￿) is
an increasing and concave transform of individual temporal utilities (i.e. G0(￿) > 0 and
G00(￿) ￿ 0).11 The standard time-additive lifetime welfare coincides with the case where
G(￿)00 = 0. As shown by Bommier (2006), the linearity of G(￿) implies that agents are net
risk neutral with respect to the life duration, in the sense that agents with no impatience are
strictly indi⁄erent between loteries with the same expected length of life (under a constant
consumption per period). On the opposite, by relying on a concave function G(￿), we allow
here for the possibility that individuals are net risk averse with respect to the length of life.
Regarding the speci￿cation of temporal utility functions u(￿), we shall also assume, in the
rest of the paper, that the utility function takes the form u(c) = v(c) + ￿, where v(0) = 0,
and limc!1 v(c) = ￿ v, with ￿ < ￿ v < 1.12
10For simplicity, we abstract here from pure time preferences. See Section 4 for a more complete model
with (natural) time discounting.
11Temporal utility functions u(￿) and concave transforms G(￿) are assumed to be the same for all agents.
12As we shall see, this decomposition into a concave function and an intercept greatly helps when consid-
ering whether short-lived agents are, ceteris paribus, penalized by a short life or not.
72.1 The laissez-faire
At the laissez-faire, and assuming that each agent has one half of the total endowment W




c2 = d2 =
W
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Contrary to common beliefs, nothing guarantees, in general, that the long-lived agent is, at
the laissez-faire, better o⁄ than the short-lived agent. However, under mild conditions on
individual temporal utility functions u(:) and the available resources W, long-lived people
are necessarily better o⁄than short-lived persons, and, thus, advantaged by Nature, despite
the equality of resources available for each of them.
Proposition 1 If u(0) ￿ 0 (i.e. ￿ ￿ 0), type-2 agents are, at the laissez-faire, better o⁄
than type-1 agents, whatever the total amount of resources W is. If u(0) < 0 (i.e. ￿ < 0),
type-2 agents are, at the laissez-faire, better o⁄ than type-1 agents if and only if W > WS,













Proof. See the Appendix.
Hence, it follows from Proposition 1 that, under either u(0) ￿ 0 or W > WS, short-lived
agents enjoy, at the laissez-faire, a lower welfare level than the one of long-lived agents.
Thus, under those conditions, short-lived agents are said to be disadvantaged by Nature, as
they enjoy, for an equal amount of resources, a lower lifetime utility level than long-lived
agents. Note that the condition for a natural disadvantage of short-lived agents is invariant
to the transform G(￿), and, as such, is robust to the functional form for lifetime welfare.
Given that it is only under a very low level of resources that short-lived are advantaged by
Nature, we shall, throughout this paper, pay a larger attention to the case where short-lived
are disadvantaged, and leave the other, less plausible case, aside.
2.2 The utilitarian optimum
Let us now examine how a social planner would distribute a given amount W of resources.















s.to c1 + c2 + d2 ￿ W

























Given G00 (:) ￿ 0, per period consumptions are equal for the type-2 agent, i.e. c2 = d2.
Regarding how the consumptions of type-1 and type-2 agents di⁄er, the solution depends
on the precise form of the transform G(￿). If G(:) was linear, so that lifetime welfare takes a
standard time-additive form, the optimal allocation would be such that c1 = c2 = d2 = W=3.
Thus, total consumption for type-1 agent would be W=3, while it would be 2W=3 for a type-
2 agent. As a consequence, utilitarianism would then redistribute from short-lived towards
long-lived agents. Under G(:) strictly concave, we may have c1 < c2 or c1 > c2, depending
on the level of the intercept ￿. As shown in Proposition 2, we have c1 > c2 under ￿
su¢ ciently large, but we may also have c1 < c2 when ￿ is low.13
Proposition 2 The utilitarian optimum is such that
- If G00(￿) = 0, we have: c1 = c2 = d2 = W=3.
- If G00(￿) < 0, we have:




, c1 > c2 = d2.




, c1 = c2 = d2 = W=3.




, c1 < c2 = d2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Under standard time-additive lifetime welfare (i.e. G00(￿) = 0), all life periods are treated
equally by the social planner, so that consumption is smoothed across people and periods.
Hence, in comparison with the laissez-faire, utilitarianism redistributes resources from type-
1 agents (i.e. short-lived agents) to type-2 agents (i.e. long-lived agents), contrary to any
intuition of compensation.14 Clearly, given that the agent of type 1 lives a shorter life, and is,
under the mild conditions of Proposition 1, disadvantaged by Nature, one may be tempted
to give him some compensation, that is, some additional consumption. But utilitarianism,
under time-additive lifetime welfare, yields the opposite result: the long-lived agent will
13Note that, in Bommier et al. (2010), it is assumed that the intercept of u(￿) is strictly positive.
14Note that this redistribution violates, under the conditions of Proposition 1, what Sen (1973) called
the Weak Equity Axiom: when an agent has a lower utility level than another for all levels of income, the
optimal allocation must not give less income to him than to the other.
9bene￿t from the same consumption per period as the short-lived, and, thus, will also bene￿t
from a higher total consumption (aggregated on the whole lifetime).
However, once lifetime welfare is a concave transform of the sum of temporal utilities,
the utilitarian allocation involves a higher consumption per period for short-lived agents





This amounts to saying that, in that case, the utilitarian social planner will, under a strictly
concave transform G(￿), give more to the short-lived per period than to the long-lived. Hence
the introduction of a concave transform G(￿) a⁄ects the optimum allocation of resources for




), to a higher
consumption (per period) to the short-lived in comparison to the utilitarian solution under
standard time-additive lifetime welfare.
Note that this result does not imply that utilitarianism necessarily compensates the
short-lived agent in comparison with the laissez-faire, even under G00(￿) < 0. Remind that,
at the laissez-faire, the short-lived consumption equals W=2, so that a compensation for a
short life requires the utilitarian optimum to involve c1 > W=2. In the light of Proposition 2,
this is not always the case. Under G00(￿) = 0, there is a double penalization of short-lived, as




, we have c1 > W=3, which
does not guarantee compensation (i.e. c1 > W=2). Actually, it is only under strict conditions
that utilitarianism compensates short-lived agents with respect to the laissez-faire.
Proposition 3 Assume W > WS. Under utilitarianism, short-lived agents receive a com-





















Note that, under W ￿ WS, short-lived agents never receive a compensation: c1 < W=2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To interpret Proposition 3, let us consider some polar cases. If lifetime welfare takes a
standard time-additive form, the LHS of the condition of Proposition 3 equals 1, whereas
the RHS is larger than 1, so that there cannot be any compensation of short-lived agents.
It is even worse, as c1 < W=2 involves a double penalization of short-lived agents: once by
Nature (shorter life) and once by Bentham (lower total consumption). Thus the concavity of
the transform G(￿) is required for the existence of a compensation of short-lived agents under
10standard utilitarianism. But although necessary, that condition is not su¢ cient. The reason
why this is not so has to do with the non-linearity of temporal welfare, which supports the
opposite of compensation. Indeed, if v(￿) was linear, the RHS of the condition in Proposition
3 would be equal to 1, to that, provided W lies strictly above the threshold level WS, the
LHS of the condition would exceed 1, and some compensation of the short-lived would
take place. However, temporal utility is likely to be concave, leading a RHS larger than 1,
and this explains why non-additive lifetime welfare does not su¢ ce, on its own, to bring a
compensation of short-lived agents with respect to the laissez-faire.
Actually, it is quite likely that G(￿) is "not concave enough" in comparison to v(￿), so that
utilitarianism does not compensate short-lived agents in comparison with the laissez-faire,
and reinforces welfare inequalities induced by Nature.15 The transform G(￿) is probably
closer to a linear function than the function v(￿), on the grounds that temporal welfare
"accumulates" quite well over time periods (i.e. with a low degree of declining marginal
"returns" from temporal welfare), so that the LHS of the condition must be close to 1, unlike
the RHS, where the di⁄erence between v0(W
4 ) and v0(W
2 ) is likely to be large, implying that
the RHS exceeds 1. Thus utilitarianism does not, in general, compensate short-lived agents,
and does even penalize them, by transfering resources towards long-lived agents. In the
light of this, a "double penalization" is, despite G(￿)00 < 0, most likely, the short-lived being
penalized once by Nature (shorter life) and once by Bentham (less total consumption).16
The above discussion has obvious consequences in welfare terms. If G(￿)00 = 0, the
inequality in lifetime welfare between long-lived agents and short-lived agents is, under
W > WS, larger at the utilitarian ￿rst-best than under the laissez-faire, as a result of the
double penalization of the short-lived.17 If, on the contrary, G(￿)00 < 0, the outcome depends
15Note, however, that such a claim should be treated with cautiousness, as we would ideally need here a
formal measure of concavity, which can only be local, making our claims relative to some values of W.
16Another way to show that the condition of Proposition 3 is likely to be violated is to rewrite it as
G0 (y)




with 0 < k < 1, x ￿ W=4 and y ￿ v(W=2) + ￿. Note ￿rst that 0 < k < 1 can be justi￿ed as follows. The
sum of the temporal welfares induced by two periods of life with consumption W=4 is, under W > WS,
necessarily larger than the welfare induced by one period of life with consumption W=2, implying 0 < k, but
also necessarily less than twice the welfare induced by one period of life with consumption W=2, implying
k < 1. Back to the condition, one can see that, given k < 1, the relative change (from the numerator to the
denominator) considered in the arguments of the two functions v(￿) and G(￿) is strictly larger on the RHS
than on the LHS (since x doubles, whereas y is multiplied by less than 2). Hence we can expect that the
e⁄ect of those relative changes on the marginal derivative is larger on the RHS than on the LHS, implying
that the RHS exceeds the LHS, contrary to the condition of Proposition 3.
17Indeed, at the laissez-faire, the inequality in lifetime welfare between the long-lived and the short-lived
11on G(￿), u(￿), W and ￿. If these are such that the condition of Proposition 3 is satis￿ed,
then utilitarianism reduces lifetime welfare inequalities between long-lived and short-lived
agents. Otherwise utilitarianism exacerbates inequalities between long-lived and short-lived
in comparison with the laissez-faire. That undesirable corollary is most plausible, since the
degree of concavity of temporal welfare is likely to be larger than the one of lifetime welfare.
From this section, it is clear that the undesirable tendency of utilitarianism to redistribute
from short-lived towards long-lived agents remains despite the non-additivity of utilities
across time-periods. Even though the concave transform G(￿) supports a redistribution
towards the short-lived in comparison with the double-additive case, this does not su¢ ce, on
its own, to bring the compensation of short-lived agents in comparison with the laissez-faire.
The reason why this does not su¢ ce has to do with the non-linearity of temporal welfare,
which supports an equalization of consumption per period per person despite longevity
inequalities. The introduction of non-additive lifetime welfare mitigates that tendency, but
does not su¢ ce to compensate short-lived agents in comparison to the laissez-faire.
How should then one proceed to obtain a compensation of short-lived agents? Un-
doubtedly, there exist several ways to implement the idea of compensation.18 One may, for
instance, consider that the short life is something for which agents are not responsible at
all, and, which, as such, requires a complete compensation of disadvantaged agents. As a
consequence, the compensation in consumption should be su¢ ciently large to equalize, if
possible, the lifetime welfare of all agents, either short-lived or long-lived.19 Whereas such
an approach is intuitively appealing, this forces us to depart from the utilitarian doctrine,
since such an egalitarian approach leads to the neglect of aggregative concerns.
Given that the present paper concentrates on utilitarianism, we shall propose, in the next
section, an alternative way to implement the compensation within the utilitarian framework,




































If G(￿) is linear, c1 = c2 = d2 = W=3, so that the ￿rst term at the optimum is larger than the ￿rst term at
the laissez-faire, while the second term is smaller. Hence the lifetime welfare inequality under utilitarianism
is then strictly larger than under the laissez-faire.
18For a survey on compensation in recent normative economics, see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006).
19Note that such an approach does not require the homogeneity of preferences, since the compensation
could be carried out on an equalitarian-equivalent basis, that is, on the basis of how agents locate with
respect to an allocation of reference (see Fleurbaey, 2005).
12and, which, as such, does not abandon all aggregative concerns on the grounds of compen-
sation and equality.20 The approach that we shall develop in the next section keeps the
utilitarian (aggregative) goal, but adds a concern for compensation. One can thus refer to
it as some form of "compensation-constrained utilitarianism".
3 Compensation-constrained utilitarianism
Our starting point for rethinking the utilitarian allocation of resources in the context of
unequal longevities consists of an observation made in the previous section. In Proposition
3, we show that, despite the introduction of non-additive lifetime welfare, an undesirable
redistribution from short-lived towards long-lived agents is most likely to be recommended
by utilitarianism, on the grounds of the concavity of temporal welfare. The reason why such
a result holds lies in the fact that standard utilitarianism does not take into account that
short-lived agents are, in general, disadvantaged in comparison with the long-lived (since a
given amount of resources generates a lower welfare for the short-lived than for the long-
lived, as shown in Proposition 1).21 The utilitarian social planner does not regard that piece
of information as relevant. This explains why, because of Gossen￿ s Law, there is a strong
tendency towards transfering to the long-lived.22
It is that precise postulate that has to be relaxed to provide a compensation of short-
lived agents. The present section proposes one way to carry out such a distinction. For that
purpose, we shall ￿rst de￿ne what we call the consumption equivalent of a long life (sub-
section 3.1), and, then, rede￿ne the social planner￿ s problem by counting this consumption
equivalent as a part of the consumption of long-lived agents (subsection 3.2).
3.1 The consumption equivalent of a long life
In order to distinguish consumptions depending on the number of periods lived, one ap-
proach consists in introducing, within the social planner￿ s problem, a ￿ctive consumption
equivalent of a long life, and to solve the so-constructed modi￿ed utilitarian problem. Such
a consumption equivalent captures the idea that living long is a kind of consumption, which,
as such, has to be taken into account as a consumption in the planner￿ s problem.
20On the compensation of short-lived agents in an equivalent-egalitarian basis, see Fleurbaey et al (2010).
21It is only under linear temporal welfare that the "handicap" of short-lived agents disappears.
22That tendency is only partly contradicted by the non-linearity of lifetime welfare (see Proposition 3).
13For that purpose, let us ￿rst denote by ￿ the ￿ctive consumption equivalent to a long
life. The consumption equivalent to a long life ￿ corresponds to the value, expressed in
the (unique) consumption good, of enjoying a long life, that is, in the present context, a
life of two periods. Alternatively, ￿ can also be interpreted as re￿ ecting the consumption
equivalent of the continuity of life across periods. In the rest of this paper, we shall assume
that such a consumption equivalent exists, in the sense that, for any longevity di⁄erential,
it is possible to ￿nd a compensation in terms of the consumption good.23
The consumption equivalent of a long life ￿ makes the agent indi⁄erent between, on the
















where c1￿, c1￿￿ and d1￿￿ are the consumptions under the laissez-faire, when the agent faces
one period of life [i.e. problem (*)] or two periods of life [i.e. problem (**)].24 From Section
2, we have c1￿ = W=2 and c1￿￿ = d1￿￿ = W=4 (as a type-1 agent with two periods of life
would behave as a type-2 agent).
The level of ￿ depends on the utility functions of agents. However, given that the concave











Hence, the consumption equivalent of a long life ￿ is invariant to the precise form of the
transform G(￿): whatever G(￿) is concave or not, this does not a⁄ect the de￿nition of ￿.
This invariance of ￿ to the precise form of G(￿) implies that the remedy we shall propose
below is distinct from applying a concave transform to the sum of temporal utilities.
The consumption equivalent of a long life ￿ depends only on the shape of the temporal







= W=2, so that ￿ would be equal to zero: to make an agent
indi⁄erent between a short life and a long life, no compensation is required, as it su¢ ces to
transfer second-period consumption to the ￿rst period. Alternatively, if u(:) is a¢ ne with






= W=2 + 2￿,
which yields ￿ = ￿: However, if u(:) is concave, and if u(0) is not too low or if resources W
are su¢ ciently large, we have u(W=2) < 2u(W=4), so that ￿ > 0.
23That assumption is far from weak, especially if the longevity di⁄erentials considered are large. In that
case, a consumption equivalent may not exist.
24Note that this would also be true for type-2 agents.
14Given that temporal utility is concave in consumption, and that resources W can be
regarded as su¢ ciently large, the intuition tends to assign to ￿ a positive sign: this captures
the idea that it is better to have, ceteris paribus, a long life rather than a short life, that is, it
is better, for a given amount of resources, to live long. Actually, the conditions guaranteeing
a positive ￿ are, by construction, the same as the ones that lead to a double penalization
by Nature and by Bentham, i.e. the conditions of Proposition 1.25
At this stage, it is also crucial to notice that, as we have identical temporal utility
functions for all agents, the consumption equivalent of a long life ￿ does not only have the
capacity to equalize the lifetime utility under a short life and a long life, but it can also
compensate a short-lived agent by giving him as much utility as a long-lived agent.
To see this, note ￿rst that, given that agents have the same utility functions, the RHS








, because all agents would solve the
consumption program similarly if put in the same situation under identical utility functions.
It follows from this that the consumption equivalent ￿ does not only bring the equality of
utility between the short life and the long life for a given individual, but it also equalizes
















as c1￿￿ = c2￿￿ and d1￿￿ = d2￿￿ for agents solving the same problem (**). The advantage of
expression (2) over expression (1) is that (2) relies on empirically observable choices: type-2
agents￿consumptions at the laissez-faire.
Note that, given that ￿ is invariant to the transform G(￿), its construction can be made
on the mere basis of information on the temporal utility function u(￿). The construction of
the consumption equivalent of a long life is illustrated on Figure 1. To ￿nd the value of ￿,
we compute the sum of temporal utilities of a type-2 agent under the laissez-faire, equal to
u(c2) + u(d2), and look for the level of c1 that yields the same temporal welfare u(c1). On
the left graph, that level is equal to W=2 + ￿. Hence, the consumption equivalent of a long
life, ￿, corresponds to the thick horizontal segment on the left graph of Figure 1.
The consumption equivalent of a long life ￿ consists, by construction, in a measure of
the damage su⁄ered by the short-lived agent, or, alternatively, a measure of the advantage
of the long-lived agent. As such, the consumption equivalent constitutes an adequate tool
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Figure 1: The consumption-equivalent
for transforming the consumptions of short-lived and long-lived agents into homogeneous,
i.e. comparable, variables, which can then serve as a basis for the social planner￿ s problem.
Whereas the standard utilitarian planning problem used to treat all consumptions as equiv-
alent, one can now consider an alternative social planning problem, based on homogeneous
consumptions. Actually, by including the consumption equivalent of a long life ￿, as a ￿c-
tive consumption of long-lived agents, the social planner can take into account the fact that
long-lived agents are, in general, advantaged by Nature (in the sense that their resource
endowment has a di⁄erent impact in welfare terms), and allocate resources accordingly.26
3.2 The modi￿ed planner￿ s problem
The modi￿ed utilitarian problem di⁄ers from the standard one (see Section 2.2) in a sin-
gle aspect: the planner, instead of de￿ning the consumption ￿ ows c1, c2 and d2 while not
taking into account longevity di⁄erentials among agents, will now distinguish between con-
sumptions that are enjoyed by short-lived and by long-lived agents. Thus the social planner
still solves a social welfare maximization problem here, but on the basis of homogenized
consumptions ~ c1, ~ c2 and ~ d2, i.e. consumptions taking longevity di⁄erentials into account.
In order to take longevity di⁄erentials into account, a natural way to proceed is to
incorporate the consumption equivalent of a long life ￿ as part of the long-lived agents￿
consumption, that is, to include it in ~ c2 and ~ d2. Indeed, if ￿ measures the advantage of the
long-lived, it makes sense to count this as a consumption enjoyed by the long-lived. This
26Note that if ￿ < 0, then the social planner would rather take into account the fact that the long-lived
are disadvantaged by Nature.
16amounts to incorporate ￿ within consumptions ~ c2 and ~ d2.
Note that there exist several ways to introduce ￿ in the consumption of the long-lived
agent. A priori, the social planner might count the whole consumption equivalent of a
long life as a part of the second-period consumption (i.e. ~ c2 = c2 and ~ d2 = d2 + ￿), or,
alternatively, as a part of the ￿rst-period consumption (i.e. ~ c2 = c2 + ￿ and ~ d2 = d2).
However, if ￿ captures the lifetime - rather than instantaneous - value of the continuation
of life as a whole, it makes more sense to spread that consumption equivalent of a long life
equally on all periods lived by a long-lived agent.
Hence the homogenized consumptions ~ c1, ~ c2 and ~ d2 can be de￿ned as:
~ c1 = c1
~ c2 = c2 +
￿
2
~ d2 = d2 +
￿
2
By allocating the resources among agents on the basis of those homogenized consump-
tions, the social planner will distinguish between the consumptions enjoyed by a long-lived
agent and the consumption enjoyed by a short-lived agent.














s.to ~ c1 = c1
s.to ~ c2 = c2 + ￿
2
s.to. ~ d2 = d2 + ￿
2
s.to c1 + c2 + d2 ￿ W
where ￿ is obtained from equation (2).27 The introduction of homogenized consumptions ~ c1,
~ c2 and ~ d2 can be regarded here as the addition of compensation constraints, aimed at making
the planner internalize longevity di⁄erentials as an ethically relevant piece of information
for the allocation problem at stake.28 Note, however, that the resource constraint remains
the same as before, since the consumption-equivalent of a long life ￿ is something ￿ctive,
which does not coincide with actual resources, whose total amount remains equal to W.
27Note that ￿ cannot be seen as a satisfaction parameter for having a long life, as ￿ is in good metrics,
not utility metrics. This point is worth being stressed, as an additive satisfaction parameter expressed in
utility terms would not a⁄ect at all the problem of the social planner.
28The standard utilitarian problem coincides with a special case, where ~ c2 = c2 and ~ d2 = d2.


















































where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint. The compensation-
constrained utilitarian optimum is presented in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 The compensation-constrained utilitarian optimum is such that:
- If G00(￿) = 0, we have c1 = W=3 + ￿=3 and c2 = d2 = W=3 ￿ ￿=6.
- If G00(￿) < 0, we have:





, c1 > W=3 + ￿=3 and c2 = d2 < W=3 ￿ ￿=6.





, c1 = W=3 + ￿=3 and c2 = d2 = W=3 ￿ ￿=6.





, c1 < W=3 + ￿=3 and c2 = d2 > W=3 ￿ ￿=6.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let us contrast those results with the standard utilitarian allocation. For that purpose,
take ￿rst the baseline case of additive lifetime welfare. In that case, we had, under standard
utilitarianism, c1 = c2 = d2 = W=3. Thus, under ￿ > 0, the social planner now gives
more per-period consumption to short-lived agents than to long-lived agents.29 Indeed, in
addition to the ￿rst-best allocation W=3, short-lived agents now also receive a third of the
consumption equivalent of a long life. On the contrary, the long-lived agents now undergo
a reduction of their consumption in the ￿rst and second periods, equal to ￿=6. Hence the
monetization of longevity gains in the long-lived￿ s consumption bundle a⁄ects the optimum,
by implying a larger consumption for the short-lived (under ￿ > 0).30
Turning now to the case where G00 (￿) 6= 0, we obtain, as in Proposition 2, that whether
the social planner allocates more resources to the short-lived or not in comparison to the
case where G00(￿) = 0 depends on the intercept of the temporal utility function ￿. Thus, as
29Alternatively, under ￿ < 0, we would have c1 < c2 = d2.
30Note also that, provided one imposes a particular functional form on u(￿), it is possible to use the
analytical solutions for c1 and c2 from Proposition 4 in such a way as to derive an explicit solution for
￿. For instance, if v(c) = c
1
k and ￿ = 0, we obtain, by substituting for c1 and c2 in the expression
u(c1 + ￿) = u(c2) + u(d2), that ￿ = W 2k￿1
4+2k￿1 . Under that formulation, ￿ is increasing in k, from W=5
when k = 1 to 2W when k = +1.
18above, the introduction of non-additive lifetime welfare may or may not reinforce the com-
pensation given to the short-lived. But what is more important is that the compensation-
constrained utilitarian optimum yields a larger consumption to short-lived agents in compar-




, we had c1 > W=3






, that c1 > W=3+￿=3, which involves more consumption to the short-lived
(under ￿ > 0).
Hence, monetizing longevity gains and counting these in the consumption bundles of
long-lived agents does signi￿cantly a⁄ect the optimum allocation of resources, in favour of
the short-lived. But is this necessarily the case that short-lived agents will be compensated
for their shorter life, that is, do they now receive a higher consumption in comparison to
the laissez-faire? Proposition 5 provides the answer to that question.
Proposition 5 Assume W > WS. Under the compensation-constrained utilitarian opti-
mum, short-lived agents receive a compensation in comparison with the laissez-faire, i.e.























Note that, under W ￿ WS, short-lived agents never receive a compensation: c1 ￿ W=2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The necessary and su¢ cient condition for compensation of short-lived agents under our
modi￿ed utilitarian framework (with respect to the laissez-faire) can be compared with
the corresponding condition under standard utilitarianism, i.e. the one in Proposition 3.
It is easy to see that, provided ￿ is positive, the denominator of the LHS is reduced in
comparison to the LHS of the condition in Proposition 3, whereas the numerator of the
RHS of the condition is reduced. Hence counting the consumption equivalent of a longer
life as a part of the consumption of long-lived agents raises, ceteris paribus, the likelihood
of compensation of the short-lived in comparison with the standard utilitarian approach.
Note that, as under standard utilitarianism, the compensation of short-lived agents de-
pends here also on the curvature of the transform G(￿). However, even if lifetime welfare
was a mere sum of temporal utilities (i.e. G00(￿) = 0), so that the LHS of the above condition
equals 1, there may still be some compensation of the short-lived here, simply because the
19RHS of the condition may be lower than 1, in the case where ￿ > W=2. Such a compensation
would have been impossible under standard utilitarianism, where the whole compensation
is driven by the non-linearity of lifetime welfare. Here the introduction of the consumption
equivalent of a longer life as a part of the consumption of long-lived agents pushes towards
compensation independently from the shape of G(￿).
In sum, Proposition 3 showed that the concavity of G(￿) was necessary but not su¢ cient
for the occurence of a compensation of short-lived agents under standard utilitarianism. It
was also most likely that compensation would not take place, except for strongly concave
G(￿). What we show here is that once we count the consumption equivalent of a longer
life as consumption of the long-lived, the concavity of G(￿) is no longer necessary for a
compensation of the short-lived in comparison to the laissez-faire. On the contrary, there
can be some compensation here despite a purely linear lifetime welfare. As such, it appears
that the homogenization of consumptions by means of the consumption equivalent of a
longer life does not only complement the role of the transform G(￿) as a determinant of the
compensation or non-compensation, but may also play as a substitute allowing compensation
even when lifetime welfare takes its standard time-additive form.
The above discussion can be easily translated in terms of lifetime welfare inequalities.
Compensation-constrained utilitarianism, by raising, under W > WS, the consumption of
the short-lived, and by reducing the one of the long-lived, tends also to reduce welfare
inequalities between long-lived and short-lived agents in comparison with the utilitarian
optimum. Moreover, provided the condition of Proposition 5 is satis￿ed, compensation-
constrained utilitarianism will also bring a compensation of short-lived agents with respect
to the laissez-faire when W > WS. That compensation may be sizeable, depending on the
fundamentals of the economy, i.e. u(￿), G(￿) and W, which determine ￿.
Note, however, that, although compensation-constrained utilitarianism can, under some
conditions, bring a sizeable compensation of short-lived agents with respect to the laissez-
faire, it does not necessarily bring the exact equalization of lifetime utility across agents
with di⁄erent lengths of life. Nothing guarantees the equalization of lifetime utilities under
compensation-constrained utilitarianism. Actually that solution is distinct from a Maximin
solution equalizing agents￿utilities. The present approach remains utilitarian, even though
it is a utilitarianism that is constrained by a broader de￿nition of consumption bundles
taking interpersonal longevity di⁄erentials into account.
20In sum, this section shows how the introduction of the consumption equivalent of a
long life in a modi￿ed utilitarian framework can contribute to avoid an undesirable corol-
lary of utilitarianism, where short-lived agents were, under general conditions, penalized
twice: once for a shorter life, and once for enjoying less consumption. The homogenization
of consumptions through counting the consumption-equivalent of a long life as long-lived
agents￿ s consumption contradicts such a double penalization of short-lived agents, and may
also support a compensation of these. In particular, this modi￿ed approach allows the com-
pensation of the short-lived even when lifetime welfare takes an additive form, that is, even
when utilitarianism recommends necessarily a double penalization of the short-lived.
4 The general model: risky longevity
A major limitation of the preceding analysis was to focus on a purely deterministic world,
where short-lived and long-lived agents can be identi￿ed ex ante by the social planner. As
a consequence, the planner could use the consumption equivalent of a long life ￿ to provide
some compensation, knowing exactly all agents￿longevity.
In reality, it is quite di¢ cult to proceed in that way, as the length of life is inherently
risky. Some agents have, because of some characteristics, a higher propensity to die, but
this does not guarantee that each of those agents will necessarily enjoy a shorter life. In
other words, the perspective of a higher expected length of life (or life expectancy) ex ante
does not necessarily imply the enjoyment of a longer life ex post.31
In order to take into account the di⁄erence between the expected length of life and the
actual length of life, we now assume that agents of type i = 1;2 all live a ￿rst period of
life with certainty, but reach the second period with a probability ￿i.32 Agents are thus
not equal, and di⁄er with respect to an exogenous characteristic in￿ uencing their longevity
prospects, so that their life expectancies 1 + ￿i are unequal. As above, we assume that
type-1 agents su⁄er from some disadvantage with respect to type-2 agents:
￿1 < ￿2
In comparison with the previous sections (where ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = 1), we now have four
31For instance, although women exhibit a higher life expectancy than men, some women have a shorter
life than some men, so that the groups with distinct survival prospects do not correspond to the groups with
distinct actual longevities.
32For simplicity, we assume here that this probability is exogenous. On optimal tax policy under endoge-
nous survival probabilities through health spending, see Leroux et al (2010).
21types of agents: besides long-lived type-2 agents and short-lived type-1 agents, we have also
long-lived type-1 agents and short-lived type-2 agents. The former enjoy, despite a low life
expectancy, a long life, while the latter have a short life, despite a high life expectancy.
The existence of 2 ￿ 2 = 4 types of agents raises the question of the dimension along
which compensation is to be made: do we want to compensate people ex ante, that is, to
compensate them for a low life expectancy? Or do we want to compensate people ex post,
that is, to compensate them for having a shorter life? The form taken by the compensation
- and, thus, the remedy to be implemented - depends on whether one adopts an ex ante or
an ex post approach. In the rest of this section, we shall consider compensation ex post, on
the grounds that what really matters, at the end of the day, is the actual standards of living
enjoyed by agents, rather than what could have been enjoyed by them.33
4.1 The laissez-faire
Under the laissez-faire, each agent of type i, who is assumed to be an expected utility


















where si denotes savings and Ri is the return on savings. It is assumed, for simplicity, that
the pure interest rate is zero, and that a perfect, class-speci￿c, annuity market exists, which
yields an actuarially fair return, so that the return on savings Ri is 1=￿i.











G0 (u(ci) + u(di))
u0(ci) = u0(di)
Under a linear G(￿), we obtain that ci = di, so that substituting into the individual￿ s lifetime
budget constraint, laissez-faire levels of consumptions are
c1 = d1 =
W
2(1 + ￿1)
c2 = d2 =
W
2(1 + ￿2)
33Note, however, that it may also be worth comparing such an ex post compensation approach with an
ex ante compensation approach. This is left for future research.
22Thus, in the laissez-faire, agents with a shorter life expectancy consume more than agents
with a high life expectancy, simply because they face a lower chance to ever be able to
consume in the second period.34
On the contrary, under G00(￿) < 0, the fraction on the LHS of the FOC is larger than









By consuming more in the ￿rst period than in the second period, agents partially insure
themselves against the risk of incuring a low level of utility both because they had a shorter
life and because they consumed less.
The conditions under which short-lived agents of type i are disadvantaged in comparison
with long-lived agents of the same type are summarized in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 Consider a set of agents with a survival probability 0 < ￿i < 1. If u(0) ￿ 0
(i.e. ￿ ￿ 0), long-lived agents are, at the laissez-faire, better o⁄ than short-lived agents,
whatever the total amount of resources W is. If u(0) < 0 (i.e. ￿ < 0), long-lived agents are,







+ ￿ = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 6 states that when the intercept of the temporal utility function is non-
negative, short-lived agents are always penalized at the laissez-faire in comparison to long-
lived agents. However, under a negative ￿, things become more complex, and it is only if
the resources available for the group W exceed some threshold WS0 that short-lived persons
are worse-o⁄than long-lived agents with the same life expectancies. Proposition 7 compares
the threshold WS0 with its counterpart in absence of risk, i.e. WS.
Proposition 7 Suppose that WS de￿nes the critical resource level above which short-lived
agents are, at the laissez-faire, worse o⁄ than long-lived agents in a riskless world. Suppose
that WS0 de￿nes the critical resource level above which short-lived agents are, at the laissez-
faire, worse o⁄ than long-lived agents in a world where the survival probability is ￿i (0 <
￿i < 1). We have: WS > WS0.
34This is due to the assumption of type-speci￿c perfect annuity markets yielding actuarially fair returns
to agents of types 1 and 2.
23Proof. See the Appendix.
The necessary condition for the disadvantage of being short-lived under risky longevity
is weaker than the corresponding condition under deterministic longevity (Proposition 1),
as the threshold of resources WS0 is inferior to WS. The intuition behind this is that, under
deterministic longevities, short-lived people can avoid some part of the damage from being
short-lived by consuming their all endowment in the ￿rst period (because they perfectly
anticipate that they will die in the end of the ￿rst period). However, in a risky world, such
a behaviour is not optimal (as it is then rational to save resources for the case where they
survive to the second period), and the mere fact of savings resources for the old days leads
to a higher damage from having a short life. Hence, short-lived agents are more penalized
in a risky world, since beyond the cost of non-spreading consumption on several periods,
there is an additional cost due to the resources that are lost due to unanticipated death.
4.2 The utilitarian optimum
The social planner aims at maximizing average lifetime welfare, subject to the budget con-






































where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint of the economy.
Proposition 8 describes the ￿rst-best optimum depending on the form of the function G(￿).
Proposition 8 The utilitarian optimum is such that:
- If G00 (￿) = 0, we have: c1 = d1 = c2 = d2 = W
2+￿1+￿2
- If G00(￿) < 0, we have:





, d2 < d1 < W
2+￿1+￿2 < c1 < c2 or d1 < d2 < W
2+￿1+￿2 <
c2 < c1.





, c2 = c1 = d1 = d2 = W
2+￿1+￿2.





, c2 < c1 < W
2+￿1+￿2 < d1 < d2 or c1 < c2 < W
2+￿1+￿2 <
d2 < d1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 8 con￿rms the crucial in￿ uence of the form of lifetime welfare on the utilitar-
ian optimum. When lifetime welfare takes a standard time-additive form, i.e. G(￿) is linear,
utilitarianism equalizes consumptions across all agents and all periods. Such an equalization
has an important redistributive impact. At the laissez-faire, type-1 agents enjoyed W
2(1+￿1)
at all periods of life, whereas type-2 enjoyed W
2(1+￿2) at all periods. Given that ￿1 < ￿2,
utilitarianism, by yielding a consumption equal to W
2+￿1+￿2 for everyone, contributes to
reduce the consumption of type-1 agents and to raise the consumption of type-2 agents.
Utilitarianism tends thus to redistribute from agents with a low life expectancy to agents
with a high life expectancy, which is ethically questionable.
Under a concave tranform G(￿), the utilitarian optimum is less easy to analyze, as its form
depends on the level of the intercept of the temporal utility function ￿. Depending on its
level, utilitarianism will recommend consumption pro￿les that are increasing or decreasing
with the age.35 Regarding the comparison of type-1 and type-2 agents, we know that
utilitarianism will not give an advantage to some type of agents at all periods, but, rather,
will give more consumption to some agents at one period and to the other agents at the
other period. However, we cannot say which group will enjoy the highest consumption at
a particular period, since this depends on the precise form of the temporal utility function
u(￿), of the concave transform G(￿), as well as on the levels of ￿1 and ￿2. Hence, it is also
di¢ cult to see how utilitarianism redistributes resources in comparison with the laissez-
faire. Proposition 9 summarizes our results regarding how utilitarianism a⁄ects inequalities
between short-lived and long-lived agents within each group.
Proposition 9 Utilitarianism a⁄ects lifetime welfare inequalities as follows:
- Under G00(￿) = 0 and for any ￿, utilitarianism reduces inequalities between the long-
lived and the short-lived for type-1 agents, and does the opposite for type-2 agents.
- Under G00(￿) < 0, the impact of utilitarianism on inequalities between the long-lived
and the short-lived within each group is the following:
35More precisely, if ￿ is su¢ ciently large, consumption pro￿les should be declining (to compensate the
disutility from a short life), while the opposite holds of ￿ is very low. In that latter case, consumption
pro￿les should be increasing (to compensate the disutility from a long life).





, utilitarianism has ambiguous e⁄ects.





, utilitarianism reduces inequalities between the long-lived
and the short-lived for type-1 agents, and does the opposite for type-2 agents.





, utilitarianism has ambiguous e⁄ects.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Therefore, whether utilitarianism tends to reinforce or reduce inequalities between short-
lived and long-lived within a group i of agents with a life expectancy 1+￿i depends on the
precise form of lifetime welfare (i.e. additive or not). If G(￿) is linear, utilitarianism reduces
inequalities between short-lived and long-lived within one group, but raises these in the






in the other cases, the utilitarian optimum depends on the temporal utility function u(￿),
the concave transform G(￿) and the other fundamentals of our economy (W, ￿1 and ￿2), so
that no precise conclusion can be drawn whithout imposing further assumptions.
Although the above analytical results are incomplete, and, as such, invite some numerical
explorations, these su¢ ce, nonetheless, to have serious doubts on the capacity of utilitar-
ianism to compensate short-lived agents. Actually, in the previous section, which focused
on the special case where ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = 1, there was already a serious questioning of
the ability of utilitarianism to compensate short-lived. Indeed, Section 3 showed that it was
only provided the transformation G(￿) was strongly concave that some compensation of the
short-lived would take place, but not otherwise. Given that result, it is no surprise that, in
the general case where 0 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ 1, the capacity of utilitarianism to compensate short-
lived agents is ambiguous. That limited capacity of utilitarianism to compensate short-lived
agents invites, as in the determinitic case, a remedy.
4.3 Compensation-constrained utilitarianism
The social planning problem described in Section 4.2 su⁄ers from the same weakness as
the one in the basic model with deterministic longevities. It does not take into account a
major source of injustice across agents, namely that the capacity of consumption to generate
lifetime welfare varies depending on the longevity of consumers (because of Gossen￿ s First
Law).36 Such an unequal capacity of temporal consumptions to produce welfare is not
36Note, once again, that this handicap of short-lived agents is only mitigated, but not eliminated, by the
introduction of a concave transform G(￿) (see Proposition 3).
26regarded as a problem by the social planner in the standard utilitarian problem, and this
is what causes the counterintuitive redistribution from the short-lived to the long-lived.
Therefore, as in Section 3, a more reasonable approach to the allocation of resources requires
￿rst to homogenize consumptions, and, then, to solve the associated planning problem under
the introduced compensation constraints.
In order to de￿ne homogeneous consumptions, i.e. consumptions ~ c1, ~ c2 and ~ d2 that take
longevity di⁄erentials into account, we shall, here again, count the consumption-equivalent
of a longer life as a part of the long-lived consumption bundle. The consumption equivalent
of a longer life can be de￿ned so as to equalize the utility of a short-lived and of a long-lived















where ci￿ and di￿ are the consumptions chosen by a type-i agent under the laissez-faire (i.e.
before knowing whether he survives to period 2 or not). A major di⁄erence with respect
to Section 3 is that consumption equivalents are here type-speci￿c, as agents make, at the
laissez-faire, distinct consumption choices (because they face di⁄erent survival prospects).
Note, however, that, although type-speci￿c, consumption equivalents keep a fundamental
invariance property: as under certain lifetimes, G(￿) does not play any role in the equation



















Regarding the sign of the consumption equivalent, it is no surprise that it depends on
the conditions guaranteeing that short-lived agents have a lower actual lifetime utility than
long-lived agents, that is, on the conditions of Proposition 5.37 As far as the di⁄erence
between the levels of ￿1 and ￿2 is concerned, we do not know whether ￿1 7 ￿2:
Let us now use the consumption-equivalents in such a way as to modify the utilitarian
planning problem. At this stage, it is crucial to notice a fundamental di⁄erence between the
deterministic longevity case studied in Section 3 and the risky longevity case studied here. In
Section 3, under certain lifetime, it was possible to identify ex ante who would be long-lived
37To see this, note that, at the laissez-faire, we have, under the assumptions that ￿ > 0 or ￿ < 0 but




















27and who would be short-lived, and such a possibility allowed us to count the consumption-
equivalent of a long-lived as a part of his consumption during both periods of his life without
any possibility of penalizing short-lived agents. In the present framework, however, there
is some risk about the length of life. As a consequence, it is no longer possible to know ex
ante who will live long or not. The presence of risk has thus an important impact on the
precise manner under which the consumption-equivalent of a long life should be counted
as a part of the consumption of the long-lived. Clearly, since no one knows ex ante the
longevity of individuals, one can no longer divide the consumption equivalent ￿i equally on
the two periods, as we used to do in the model without risk.38 Given that it is only in the
second period that long-lived agents can be identi￿ed, the entire consumption-equivalent of
a long life ￿i should be counted as a part of second-period consumption. This leads to the
following homogenized consumptions ~ c1, ~ c2 and ~ d2:
~ c1 = c1
~ d1 = d1 + ￿1
~ c2 = c2
~ d2 = d2 + ￿2
Let us now rederive the compensation-constrained utilitarian optimum under that alter-
native implementation of the remedy. Assigning the entire consumption equivalent of a long
















s.to ~ ci = ci







where ￿i is estimated from expression (3), at the laissez-faire. Here again, the homog-
enization of consumptions through the introduction of a consumption equivalent in the
long-lived￿ s consumption can be regarded as the addition of compensation constraints to
38Indeed, counting part of the consumption-equivalent of a long life as ￿rst-period consumption would,
in the present context, penalize even more the short-lived in comparison with standard utilitarianism, by
reducing his lifetime welfare even more.































+ u(d1 + ￿1)
￿





+ u(d2 + ￿2)
￿
u0(d2 + ￿2) = ￿
where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint of the economy.
Here again, we expect that the optimum must depend on the particular speci￿cation for
lifetime welfare. Proposition 10 summarizes our results.
Proposition 10 The compensation-constrained utilitarian optimum is such that:
- If G00 (:) = 0, we have:
c1 = c2 =
W + ￿1￿1 + ￿2￿2
2 + ￿1 + ￿2
d1 =
W + ￿2￿2 ￿ ￿1 ￿
2 + ￿2￿
2 + ￿1 + ￿2
d2 =
W + ￿1￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿
2 + ￿1￿
2 + ￿1 + ￿2
- If G00(￿) < 0, we have, under ￿i > 0:



































































Proof. See the Appendix.
In order to interpret the modi￿ed utilitarian optimum in that general framework, we
shall here ￿rst concentrate on the benchmark case where lifetime welfare takes a standard
time-additive form (i.e. G00(￿) = 0), and leave the interpretation of the case where G(￿) is
concave for the end of this section.
In the standard case where G(￿)00 = 0, ￿rst-period consumptions are equalised, c1 = c2
and this consumption level is also, under either ￿1 > 0 and/or ￿2 > 0, higher than under
39The standard utilitarian problem coincides with the special case where ~ ci = ci and ~ di = di for all agents
of type i = 1;2.
29standard utilitarianism, so that short-lived agents are, in comparison with standard utilitar-
ianism, better o⁄. However, second-period consumptions d1 and d2, which are now di⁄erent
for type-1 and type-2 agents, are, in general, smaller than under standard utilitarianism.
Actually, this is the case provided ￿2 ￿
￿2 ￿ ￿1￿
￿ 2￿1 < 0 and ￿1 ￿
￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿ 2￿2 < 0,
which are mild conditions (as the di⁄erence between ￿1 and ￿2 cannot be extremely large,
given that the di⁄erence between ￿1 and ￿2 must belong to [0;1]).
Still taking the simplest case of G00 (:) = 0, let us now compare ex post welfare inequalities
by proceeding as before and by comparing lifetime utilities with the utilitarian case:
compensation-constrained utilitarianism utilitarianism










































































Table 1: Some welfare comparisons
Thus compensation-constrained utilitarianism increases the welfare of all short-lived
agents with respect to utilitarianism, while this may not be the case for long-lived agents in
comparison with the situation under utilitarianism, depending on the values of ￿1 and ￿2.
Regarding the inequalities between long-lived and short-lived agents inside a given group
(either type-1 or type-2), we ￿nd that inequalities inside group 1 are reduced as compared
to utilitarianism if ￿2 ￿
￿2 ￿ ￿1￿
￿ 2￿1 < 0 and inequalities inside group 2 are also reduced
if ￿1 ￿
￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿ 2￿2 < 0. This is due to the simple fact that compensation-constrained
utilitarianism raises ￿rst-period consumptions and reduces, under mild conditions, second-
period consumptions with respect to utilitarianism, so that this reduces inequalities of life-
time welfare between the short-lived and the long-lived of a given type i. This reduction
of lifetime welfare inequalities within each group occurs under general conditions, that is, if
one excludes extreme cases where the di⁄erential between the two consumption equivalents
￿1 and ￿2 is extremely large (i.e. cases where survival probabilities di⁄er strongly).40
40Under extreme di⁄erentials between ￿1 and ￿2, lifetime welfare inequalities within one group may be
increased under our remedy (but not in the other group). However, such a large gap is implausible, especially
if the groups under study do not exhibit large di⁄erences in group-speci￿c life expectancies.
30Proposition 11 In comparison with utilitarianism and under G00(￿) = 0 and ￿i > 0,
compensation-constrained utilitarianism:
- increases the welfare of short-lived agents, but may or may not increase the welfare of
long-lived agents;
- reduces lifetime welfare inequalities within each group i = 1;2 between long-lived agents
and short-lived agents, provided ￿2 ￿
￿2 ￿ ￿1￿
￿ 2￿1 < 0 and ￿1 ￿
￿1 ￿ ￿2￿
￿ 2￿2 < 0.
Proof. The proof follows from the above table.
The intuition behind these two latter conditions is the following. If, for instance, the
consumption equivalent for one group is extremely large, let us say, if ￿1 >> ￿2, then, un-
der compensation-constrained utilitarianism, there would be a reduction of lifetime welfare
inequalities between short-lived and long-lived type-1 agents, but, because of redistributions
across types favouring type-2 agents, a rise of lifetime welfare inequalities between the short-
lived and the long-lived type-2 agents. But such a speci￿c case is hardly plausible, so that,
in general, compensation-constrained utilitarianism reduces inequalities between long-lived
and short-lived in each group.
Besides the impact on inequalities, the change in the way in which ￿i is spread on the
lifecycle has also important consequences for other aspects of the social optimum. Remember
that, because of the impossibility to identify ex ante who would be long-lived or short-lived
due to risk about the length of life, compensation-constrained utilitarianism could not, unlike
in the basic deterministic model, spread the consumption-equivalent of a long life on the
whole lifecycle of agents. Hence it had to be counted entirely as second-period consumption.
A major corollary of this is that the second-period consumption of agents di is now lower
than their ￿rst-period consumption ci. This results from the planner￿ s will to compensate
short-lived agents. The non-equalization of marginal utilities of consumption over time can
be regarded as an e¢ ciency loss: from an e¢ ciency perspective, consumption should be
smoothed, for each individual, across all his life periods. However, the compensation requires
to give a higher ￿rst-period consumption to all agents than to survivors in the second period,
which implies that consumption cannot be smoothed across periods for long-lived agents.
Therefore a tension arises between compensation and e¢ ciency concerns.
Let us now add a few observations on the general case where G00(￿) < 0. In that case, the
compensation-constrained utilitarian optimum depends on several determinants, including
the intercept of the temporal utility function ￿. This result does not surprise us, as that
31intercept was playing a similar role in the benchmark model without risk. Here again,
compensation-constrained utilitarianism recommends decreasing or increasing consumption
pro￿les with the age, depending on the level of ￿. There is, however, a signi￿cant dif-
ference with respect to the benchmark deterministic model. In the riskless model, the
consumption-equivalent of a long life was equal for all agents, and this uniqueness allowed
us to characterize almost completely the modi￿ed utilitarian solution. On the contrary, in
the model with risky longevity, the consumption-equivalent of a long life is type-speci￿c.41
This is the reason why it is hard to say analytically more on the modi￿ed utilitarian solu-
tion under non-additive lifetime welfare. Nonetheless, given that lifetime welfare may not
be additive over time, it makes sense to complement the above analytical discussion by some
numerical simulations. This is the task of the next section.
5 A numerical illustration
Let us now illustrate, by means of numerical simulations, how the laissez-faire, the utilitarian
optimum and the compensation-constrained utilitarian optimum di⁄er in a simple economy
with risky longevity of the kind studied in Section 4. For that purpose, we need ￿rst to
impose some functional forms for agents￿utility functions G(￿) and u(￿), and to calibrate
the type-speci￿c survival probabilities ￿1 and ￿2 as well as the total endowment W.
Regarding the temporal utility function u(￿), we assume, for simplicity, that it has a





where ￿ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, while ￿ is an intercept. Note the cru-
cial role played by those two preference parameters for the computation of the consumption
equivalent of a long life. If, for instance, utility is linear in consumption, we have ￿ = ￿ = 0,
so that the consumption equivalent is zero. However, for other values of preference parame-
ters, ￿i is likely to vary signi￿cantly.42 Note that, under ￿ < 1, if ￿ is too large (i.e. the
utility from mere survival is large), there cannot be any consumption equivalent of a long
life, as no consumption can compensate for the fact of facing a shorter life.
41Indeed the consumption-equivalent of a long life re￿ects the actual consumption choices of agents,
which depend on agents￿ s beliefs about survival. Hence the di⁄erences in life expectancies 1 + ￿1 and
1+￿2, by leading to a di⁄erential in the savings decision at the laissez-faire, tend also to a⁄ect the levels of
the consumption-equivalent, and, thus, the optimal consumption pro￿les under compensation-constrained
utilitarianism.
42For an empirical study on that topic, see Ponthiere (2008).
32Regarding the calibration of ￿ and ￿, we shall proceed as follows. In all cases, we will
assume that ￿ = 0:5 but we will make ￿ vary and take three distinct values: 0, ￿2 and 2.43
In the case where the lifetime utility function is linear in the temporal utility of consumption,
we also make a more realistic calibration of the intercept, on the basis of empirical estimates
of the value of a statistical life, and show, in the Appendix, that a plausible value for the
intercept of the temporal utility function is ￿ = 4:472.
As far as the functional form for lifetime welfare is concerned, we shall here rely on a










When ￿ equals 1, we are back to the standard case where lifetime welfare is the sum of
temporal utilities. On the contrary, when ￿ is less than 1, lifetime welfare takes a non-
additive form close to the one discussed in Bommier (2006).
To illustrate the model of Section 4, we need also to identify two groups with di⁄erent
survival prospects. As an example, we shall here suppose that type-1 agents are males and
type-2 agents are females. In the U.S., life expectancy at birth for males is about 75 years,
equal here to 1 + ￿1 = 1:25.44 For women, life expectancy is 80.5 years, equal here to
1 + ￿2 = 1:40. Thus, one has ￿1 = 0:25 and ￿2 = 0:40. Finally, we make the assumption of
a total endowment equal to W = 20.
Let us now compare the laissez-faire, the utilitarian optimum and the compensation-
constrained utilitarian optimum. For that purpose, Table 2 concentrates on the benchmark
case where lifetime welfare is the mere sum of temporal utilities (i.e. ￿ = 1), and provides
estimates of the consumptions and the welfare levels for all agents, who can be either of type
1 or type 2, and can be either short-lived (i.e. superscript SL) or long-lived (i.e. superscript
LL). For the sake of completeness, Table 1 provides those various estimates for di⁄erent
values of the intercept parameter ￿.
Let us ￿rst consider, as a benchmark example, the case where ￿ = 0. At the laissez-faire,
consumption is smoothed across periods, but is larger for type-1 agents, who face a lower
chance of surviving till the second period. Moreover, short-lived agents are worse-o⁄ than
long-lived agents who belong to the same group, illustrating the ￿rst part of Proposition 6.
43Note that, while empirical studies of ￿ yield an estimate of 0.83 (see Blundell et al, 1994), such estimates
cannot be used here, as these rely on a model where the period is a year, unlike in the present model.
44Indeed, if a period is of length 40 years, and starting at the age of 25, we obtain that a life expectancy
of 75 years involves 65 years (i.e. 25 years + the ￿rst period) + 10 years, equal to 0.25 period.
33At the utilitarian optimum, consumption is now equalized at all periods for all agents, so
that it reduces inequalities between short-lived and long-lived agents of the type-1 group,
whereas it increases them for type-2 agents, in conformity with Proposition 9.45
￿ = 1 c1 c2 d1 d2 U1SL U1LL U2SL U2LL
￿ = ￿2 Laissez-faire 8.00 7.14 8.00 7.14 3.66 7.31 3.35 6.69
Utilitarianism 7.55 7.55 7.55 7.55 3.49 6.99 3.49 6.99
CC Utilitarianism 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 4.32 2.32 4.32 2.32
￿1= 13:69; ￿2= 11:74
￿ = 0 Laissez-faire 8.00 7.14 8.00 7.14 5.66 11.31 5.35 10.69
Utilitarianism 7.55 7.55 7.55 7.55 5.49 10.99 5.49 10.99
CC Utilitarianism 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 6.32 6.32 6.32 6.32
￿1= 24:00; ￿2= 21:43
￿ = 2 Laissez-faire 8.00 7.14 8.00 7.14 7.66 15.31 7.35 14.69
Utilitarianism 7.55 7.55 7.55 7.55 7.49 14.99 7.49 14.99
CC Utilitarianism 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 8.32 10.32 8.32 10.32
￿1= 36:31; ￿2= 33:12
￿ = 4:472 Laissez-faire 8.00 7.14 8.00 7.14 10.13 20.26 9.82 19.63
Utilitarianism 7.55 7.55 7.55 7.55 9.97 19.93 9.97 19.93
CC Utilitarianism 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 10.80 15.27 10.80 15.27
￿1= 54:30; ￿2= 50:33
Table 2: Outcomes under time-additive lifetime welfare
Turning now to the compensation-constrained utilitarian optimum, we can notice that
this leads to a corner solution: the imputation of the consumption-equivalent of a long life
(estimated at the laissez-faire) to the long-lived second-period consumption implies that
the total endowment W should be divided entirely between the ￿rst-period consumptions
of types 1 and 2, whereas nothing should be left for second-period consumption.46 As a
consequence, it appears that compensation-constrained utilitarianism implies a rise in the
welfare of short-lived agents, as well as a fall in the welfare of long-lived agents, in comparison
with the laissez-faire and the standard utilitarian optimum. Thus, under ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0,
the condition stated in Proposition 11 is satis￿ed, in the sense that the compensation-
constrained utilitarian optimum involves, in comparison with standard utilitarianism, a
reduction of inequalities between the long-lived and the short-lived. But more importantly,
45Moreover, (short-lived and long-lived) type-2 agents end up with a higher utility than under the laissez-
faire, whereas type-1 agents are always worse-o⁄, independently from living one or two periods.
46Note also that the consumption equivalents of a longer life (estimated at the laissez-faire) are such that
￿1 > ￿2, which was unclear from our theoretical part.
34the modi￿ed utilitarian optimum brings also a compensation to the short-lived even in
comparison with the laissez-faire, since compensation-constrained utilitarianism raises the
welfare of the short-lived and reduces the welfare of the long-lived in comparison to the
laissez-faire. Given that second-period consumptions are set to 0 and ￿ equals also 0,
compensation-constrained utilitarianism yields here a perfect equalization of lifetime welfare
across all agents, either short-lived or long-lived, whatever their survival prospects were.
Thus, in this special case, compensation-constrained utilitarianism treats all agents equally,
independently from their initial survival chance and from their actual longevity.
Let us now examine how sensitive those results are to the intercept ￿. First note that the
value of the intercept does not play any role on consumption levels at the laissez-faire and
at the standard utilitarian optimum and compensation-constrained utilitarian optimum.47
Only welfare levels and consumption equivalents ￿i di⁄er, since these are increasing in the
level of ￿. Thus, as under ￿ = 0, compensation-constrained utilitarianism, by concentrating
all resources on ￿rst-period consumption, brings a compensation to short-lived agents in
comparison with the laissez-faire. The unique di⁄erence is that, when comparing ex post
lifetime welfare levels, long-lived agents remain better o⁄ than short-lived agents under
￿ > 0, since, in that case, it is impossible to make the short-lived as well o⁄ as the long-
lived on the mere basis of a higher ￿rst-period consumption. Due to risky longevity, one
cannot identify ex ante who will be short-lived or long-lived, and this explains the incapacity
to provide a full equality of lifetime welfare.
In sum, Table 2, by assuming a linear lifetime utility, illustrates the capacity of compensation-
constrained utilitarianism to operate some compensation of the short-lived in comparison
with the laissez-faire and the standard utilitarian optimum. The remedy proposed here com-
pensates all short-lived agents (men and women) equally, by sharing equally all resources in
the ￿rst-period and by leaving nothing for the second period.
Table 3 assumes ￿ = 1=2 < 1, to examine how assumptions on lifetime welfare a⁄ect
our results.48 In the laissez-faire, ￿rst-period consumptions are always higher than second-
period ones for any value of ￿. This is in conformity with the analytical ￿ndings of Section
4. Moreover, we ￿nd also that per-period consumptions are higher for type-1 agents than
47Note that ￿rst order conditions are independant from ￿, so that the laissez-faire and the utilitarian
levels of consumption are identical for any value of ￿.
48Here again, the allocations under study are provided under ￿ = ￿2, 0 and 2. We exclude the case where
￿ = 4:472 as this value, based on the value of a statistical life, was computed under the assumption that
G(￿) was linear. Taking this change into account would complicate our computations of the new intercept,
without giving more insights.
35for type-2 agents. This last point was ambiguous in the theoretical section. Under util-
itarianism, consumption pro￿les are now always decreasing with age, in conformity with
Proposition 8. We ￿nd also that type-1 agents now get higher ￿rst-period consumption but
lower second-period consumption than type-2 agents. Again, our analytical part could not
establish this clearly. We still ￿nd that inequalities between short-lived and long-lived agents
of type-1 are reduced, while it is the reverse for type-2 agents, yet the di⁄erences are smaller
than in the linear case. This illustrates that departing from the standard time-additive life-
time welfare postulates reduces the welfare inequalities between short-lived and long-lived
under utilitarianism. However, those inequalities remain large, so that it can hardly be said
that utilitarianism jointly with non-additive lifetime welfare su¢ ces to bring a compensation
to short-lived agents. On the contrary, the compensation-constrained utilitarian optimum,
by giving maximum consumption in the ￿rst period and zero consumption in the second
period, brings a compensation of short-lived persons. Thus, even though the introduction of
a concave transform G(￿) can partly mitigate the natural tendency of utilitarianism to redis-
tribute resources from short-lived towards long-lived, this numerical example suggests that
a compensation of short-lived agents cannot be carried out within standard utilitarianism,
but requires the introduction of compensation constraints.49
￿ = 0:5 c1 c2 d1 d2 U1SL U1LL U2SL U2LL
￿ = ￿2 Laissez-faire 8.59 7.81 5.66 5.48 3.93 5.14 3.79 5.01
Utilitarianism 8.38 7.99 5.53 5.61 3.89 5.10 3.82 5.06
CC Utilitarianism 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 4.16 3.05 4.16 3.05
￿1= 9:98; ￿2= 9:30
￿ = 0 Laissez-faire 8.63 7.86 5.48 5.36 4.85 6.50 4.74 6.40
Utilitarianism 8.48 7.99 5.38 5.45 4.83 6.47 4.76 6.43
CC Utilitarianism 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 5.03 5.03 5.03 5.03
￿1= 19:23; ￿2= 18:34
￿ = 2 Laissez-faire 8.65 7.88 5.38 5.30 5.62 7.62 5.52 7.54
Utilitarianism 8.54 7.99 5.31 5.37 5.60 7.60 5.53 7.56
CC Utilitarianism 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 5.77 6.43 5.77 6.43
￿1= 30:56; ￿2= 29:44
Table 3: Outcomes under non-time-additive lifetime welfare
49We have also run these simulations for other values of ￿, such as ￿ = 0:75. Our results are robust to a
variation of ￿. Under compensation-constrained utilitarianism, it is always optimal to distribute equally all
resources in the ￿rst period and to leave nothing for the second one. Thus, individuals with the same actual
length of life obtain the same utility. Only the utility gaps between short- and long-lived agents within the
same initial group increase when ￿ increase.
36In sum, this section illustrates that, whereas classical utilitarianism can hardly compen-
sate short-lived agents - even under non-additive lifetime welfare - compensation-constrained
utilitarianism can operate such a compensation, by raising ￿rst-period consumption while
reducing second-period consumption. Those results are robust to the precise speci￿cation of
preferences. Nonetheless, the size of welfare inequalities between short-lived and long-lived
agents depends on the speci￿cation of preferences. Some welfare inequalities may still pre-
vail despite the remedy we propose, simply because of the risky nature of longevity, which
prevents a di⁄erentiated treatment of agents in the ￿rst period.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper starts from a paradoxical result of classical utilitarianism: a tendency, under
standard assumptions, to redistribute resources from short-lived to long-lived agents, im-
plying, under mild conditions, a double penalization of short-lived agents: one penalty by
Nature, one by Bentham. We proposed a re-examination of the treatment of unequal longevi-
ties under utilitarianism, on the basis of a simple two-period model with deterministic or
risky longevities. The major contributions of the paper are twofold.
Firstly, we identi￿ed formal conditions under which short-lived agents are worse o⁄than
long-lived agents at the laissez-faire. The crucial role of the intercept of the temporal
utility function and of the society￿ s endowment was highlighted. It was also shown that
the introduction of risk about the length of life weakens the conditions under which short-
lived agents are disadvantaged with respect to long-lived agents, because of lost savings
due to unanticipated death. We also identi￿ed conditions under which utilitarianism can
compensate short-lived agents with respect to the laissez-faire. Those conditions are never
satis￿ed under standard time-additive lifetime welfare, and may only be satis￿ed under a
high degree of concavity of the transform applied to the sum of temporal utilities. The
reason why departing from time-additive lifetime welfare does not, in general, su¢ ce to
bring a compensation of the short-lived with respect to the laissez-faire has to do with
the fact that the standard utilitarian problem does not take into account the fundamental
source of injustice between short-lived and long-lived agents, namely that consumption has a
higher capacity to generate lifetime welfare for long-lived agents than for short-lived agents
(because of Gossen￿ s First Law). Note that taking a concave transform of the sum of
37temporal utilities only mitigates - but does not eliminate - that problem.
Secondly, and on the basis of that ￿rst observation, we proposed a remedy to that absence
of compensation. What we proposed is to solve a utilitarian social planning problem that
concerns homogenized consumptions, i.e. consumptions that are made comparable despite
unequal longevities. In what can be called a compensation-constrained utilitarianism, the
consumption-equivalent of a long life is counted as a part of the consumption of the long-
lived agents, in such a way as to take into account the natural advantage of long-lived agents.
The imputation of the consumption equivalent of a long life (estimated at the laissez-faire)
to the consumption of long-lived agents at all periods was shown to yield a compensation
to the short-lived agents with respect to utilitarianism, and was also shown to reinforce
the likelihood of a compensation of the short-lived with respect to the laissez-faire. Hence,
whereas utilitarianism tends to maintain - and sometimes to exacerbate - welfare inequali-
ties caused by Nature (depending on the form of lifetime welfare), compensation-constrained
utilitarianism implies, on the contrary, a much more intuitive treatment of agents disadvan-
taged by Nature. We also showed numerically that the large welfare inequalities that may
subsist under standard utilitarianism despite non-additive lifetime welfare are necessarily
reduced under compensation-constrained utilitarianism.
Thanks to those two contributions, the present study casts new light on a variety of prob-
lems of redistribution involving longevity inequalities. Longevity di⁄erentials are present in
many policy debates, concerning pensions, long-term care, etc. Hence, in all those issues, if
one acts as a standard utilitarian policy maker, there is hardly any compensation of short-
lived agents, and we may even have large transfers towards long-lived agents, in opposition
with basic ethical intuition. More importantly, such a counterintuitive redistribution is most
likely to hold despite non-additive lifetime welfare, so that one can harldy rely on such a
solution. This is the reason why the present study proposed an alternative road, which, as
we showed, yields some compensation to the short-lived under plausible conditions.
Finally, three extensions of this paper should be mentionned. First, while the social
planner takes here the consumption equivalent of a long life as a constant, which is estimated
on the basis of laissez-faire choices, one may argue that the social planner should solve his
modi￿ed problem while taking the consumption equivalent as a variable, which depends
on his own allocation of resources.50 Second, whereas this paper concentrates on ￿rst-best
50That alternative approach, which captures the idea that the consumption equivalent of a long life
depends on what life is, would be worth being pursued, but is not trivial, as the endogeneity of ￿ requires
38optimum (without and with risk about the length of life), one may also want to explore the
second-best problem, under non observability of type-speci￿c life expectancies, and, thus,
of the consumption equivalents. Third, although this paper concentrates on a disease (and
a cure) for utilitarianism under unequal longevities, it would be worth considering whether
other ethical frameworks su⁄er from the same kind of problem, and, more generally, to
consider the issue of compensation of unequal longevities outside utilitarianism.51
Hence much work remains to be done. In any case, taking longevity di⁄erentials into
account properly is not, for a government, optional. In the light of the central position of
longevity as a determinant of human lifetime welfare, we believe that it is a necessity.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1




































That inequality is, under u(0) ￿ 0 (i.e. ￿ ￿ 0) and u00(￿) < 0, always satis￿ed. Thus the
￿rst part of Proposition 1 follows from the concavity of u(:).











+ ￿ > 0
The LHS of that expression is negative at W = 0, but tends to ￿ v +￿ > 0 when W tends to
in￿nity. Hence, by continuity, there must exist a resource level WS at which that expression
equals zero. For higher resource levels, the above inequality is strictly satis￿ed, so that short-
lived agents are, at the laissez-faire, worse o⁄ than long-lived agents, despite the equality
of endowment W=2. Note that this condition is invariant to the transform G(￿), so that
whether short-lived agents are worse o⁄ or better o⁄ than long-lived agents has nothing to
do with the precise shape of the lifetime welfare function, i.e. time-additive or not.
an additional constraint to be imposed, in order to avoid a multiplicity of optima.
51A ￿rst step in that direction is provided by Fleurbaey et al (2010).
397.2 Proof of Proposition 2





= ku0(d2), from which it follows that c1 = c2 = d2.
Let us thus focus on the case where G00 (￿) < 0. From the FOCs it is obvious that we
have c2 = d2 in all cases.




. Let us now prove by reductio ad absurdum that
c1 > W=3. For that purpose, assume instead that c1 ￿ W=3 and c2 = d2 ￿ W=3. Un-






+ 2￿ > v
￿
c1￿
















. Moreover, if c1 ￿ W=3 and c2 = d2 ￿ W=3, we also have v0 ￿
c1￿
￿








































a contradiction is reached. It must be the case that c1 > W=3 and c2 = d2 < W=3, so that
c1 > c2 = d2.




. In that case, it is easy to see that, under c1 = W=3






+2￿ = 0 = v
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, so that the FOC of the social planner￿ s problem is satis￿ed. Hence
c1 = c2 = d2 = W=3 is the solution.




. Here again, we show that c1 < c2 = d2
by reduction ad absurdum. For that purpose, assume that c1 ￿ W=3 and c2 = d2 ￿
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. Moreover, if c1 ￿ W=3 and
c2 = d2 ￿ W=3, we also have v0 ￿
c1￿








































. Hence a contradiction is reached. It must be the case that
c1 < W=3 and c2 = d2 > W=3.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Assume W > WS, so that long-lived agents are necessarily better o⁄than short-lived agents
at the laissez-faire. Short-lived agents receive a compensation when the utilitarian optimum






























40that is, the marginal utility gain from raising the consumption of the short-lived beyond his
laissez-faire consumption W=2 (i.e. the LHS) exceeds the marginal utility loss from reducing
the consumption of the long-lived.

































+ ￿. From this, it is easy to see








+￿. Hence the LHS
of the above condition is lower than 1. Given that the RHS exceeds 1 by the concavity of
v(:), it is certain that the condition is not satis￿ed, so that c1 ￿ W=2.
However, if W > WS, there may be compensation of the short-lived or not, depending
on the curvatures of v(￿), G(￿) and the levels of W and ￿.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is close to the one of Proposition 2.
Take ￿rst the case where G(￿) is linear. In that case, we have, under the conditions of
Proposition 1,
c1 > c2 = d2
When using both the FOCs and the budget constraint, it is easy to see that we have
c1 = W=3 + ￿=3
c2 = d2 = W=3 ￿ ￿=6
When G00 (￿) < 0, we still have c2 = d2, but the level of c1 depends on the level of ￿.





. Let us show that c1 > W=3 + ￿=3 and c2 =
d2 < W=3 ￿ ￿=6 by reduction ad absurdum. For that purpose, assume ￿rst that c1 ￿
W=3 + ￿=3 and c2 = d2 ￿ W=3 ￿ ￿=6. In that case, we have u0 ￿
c1￿
￿ u0(c2 + ￿
2)
and, provided ￿ > ￿v (W=3 + ￿=3) , we have v
￿
c1￿














































, which is in contradiction with the FOC of the planner￿ s
problem. It must be the case that c1 > W=3 + ￿=3 and c2 = d2 < W=3 ￿ ￿=6.





. In that case, it is easy to see that, under
































, so that the FOC of the
social planner￿ s problem is satis￿ed. Hence c1 = W=3 + ￿=3 and c2 = d2 = W=3 ￿ ￿=6 is
the solution.





. Here again, we show that c1 < W=3+￿=3
and c2 = d2 > W=3 ￿ ￿=6 by reduction ad absurdum. For that purpose, assume that


































c1 ￿ W=3+￿=3 and c2 = d2 ￿ W=3￿￿=6, we also have v0 ￿
c1￿
￿ v0(c2+ ￿





















































It must be the case that c1 < W=3 + ￿=3 and c2 = d2 > W=3 ￿ ￿=6.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5 can be proved as follows. Suppose W > WS, so that long-lived agents are
better than short-lived agents at the laissez-faire. Short-lived agents can be said to be
compensated with respect to the laissez-faire when c1 exceeds W=2 under the modi￿ed







































that is, the marginal utility gain from raising c1 above W=2 is larger than the marginal
utility loss from reducing c2 and d2 below W=4. That expression can be rewritten as the
condition of Proposition 5.
Under W ￿ WS, long-lived agents are not better o⁄than short-lived agents at the laissez-


































































































. Hence the above inequality is necessarily violated, implying c1 < W=2.
427.6 Proof of Proposition 6
At the laissez-faire, the short-lived agents with survival probability ￿i are disadvantaged
with respect to the long-lived if and only if
G(u(ci)) < G(u(ci) + u(di))
that is, if and only if
v (di) + ￿ > 0
This is always true under u(0) ￿ 0 (i.e. ￿ ￿ 0), whatever we have G00 (:) = 0 or G00 (:) < 0.
However, under u(0) < 0, it is not necessarly the case that long-lived are always better o⁄
than short lived. Indeed, under ￿ < 0, the LHS is negative at W = 0. However, as W tends
to in￿nity, the LHS tends to ￿ v + ￿ > 0. Hence, by continuity, there must exist a critical
level of total endowment WS0 for each agent with survival probability ￿isuch that a strict






+ ￿ = 0
7.7 Proof of Proposition 7











+ ￿ = 0
















from which it is trivial to see that WS > WS0. Let us proof this by contradiction. Suppose





















which is necessarily false, as the LHS always exceeds the RHS under 0 < ￿i < 1. Assume





















which is also false, because the LHS always exceeds the RHS under 0 < ￿i < 1. Therefore
it must be true that WS > WS0.
437.8 Proof of Proposition 8
The case of G linear is trivial. In this case, G0 (￿) is equal to a constant and from the ￿rst
order condition, c1 = d1 = c2 = d2. Replacing into the ressource constraint, we obtain the
consumption levels, W=
￿
2 + ￿1 + ￿2￿
.
Let now turn to the case where G00 (￿) < 0.





. Let us ￿rst show that ci > W
2+￿1+￿2 > di. Assume
instead that di > W















= ￿. However, it is easy to see that there must be a contradition








































given that the LHS and the RHS of that expression are equal to ￿, a contradiction is
reached, con￿rming that ci > W
2+￿1+￿2 > di. Therefore we have c1 > d1 and c2 > d2. Hence
6 rankings are possible:
d2 < c2 < d1 < c1;d1 < c1 < d2 < c2
d2 < d1 < c2 < c1;d1 < d2 < c1 < c2
d1 < d2 < c2 < c1;d2 < d1 < c1 < c2
Let us eliminate some of these by contradiction.







. But given that u(c2) + u(d2) <






. But as u0(d1) <













. Hence that ranking is not
possible.
Similar arguments can be used to show by contradiction that the rankings d1 < c1 <
d2 < c2, d2 < d1 < c2 < c1, and d1 < d2 < c1 < c2 are not possible. We are left with two
rankings: d1 < d2 < c2 < c1 or d2 < d1 < c1 < c2.





. Hence, if one imposes c2 = c1 = d1 = d2 = W
2+￿1+￿2,




























2 + ￿1 + ￿2
￿
G0 (0) = ￿
from which it appears clearly that c2 = c1 = d1 = d2 = W
2+￿1+￿2 is the unique solution to
the planner￿ s problem.





. Let us ￿rst show that ci < W
2+￿1+￿2 < di. Assume
instead that di < W















= ￿. However, it is easy to see that there must be a contradition

























. But if di < ci, we have















given that the LHS and the RHS of that expression are equal to ￿, a contradiction is
reached, con￿rming that ci < W
2+￿1+￿2 < di. Therefore we have c1 < d1 and c2 < d2. Hence
6 rankings are possible:
c2 < d2 < c1 < d1;c1 < d1 < c2 < d2
c2 < c1 < d2 < d1;c1 < c2 < d1 < d2
c1 < c2 < d2 < d1;c2 < c1 < d1 < d2
By using the same kind of proof as above, we can rule out the ￿rst four rankings by
contradiction, and thus we keep c1 < c2 < d2 < d1 and c2 < c1 < d1 < d2.
7.9 Proof of Proposition 9
Assume ￿rst that G(￿) is linear. Laissez-faire inequalities between a long-lived and a short-





+ ￿, while, in the
￿rst-best utilitarian optimum, these inequalities are independant of the survival probability




2 + ￿1 + ￿2￿￿
+￿. For agents with survival probability ￿1, it is easy to
45show that inequalities are higher in the laissez-faire than in the ￿rst-best, while for agents
with survival probability ￿2, it is the opposite.
Under G(￿) non linear, the utilitarian optimum depends on various elements (see Propo-
sition 7).





, the di⁄erence in lifetime welfare between long-lived and short-





+￿, as d1FB <
W





+ ￿, as d1LF <
W
2(1+￿1). Given that ￿1 < ￿2, we have W
2+￿1+￿2 < W
2(1+￿1). But this does not allow us to
conclude on whether the inequality is reduced or increased by utilitarianism. For type-2
agents, the di⁄erence in lifetime welfare between long-lived and short-lived agents is, at the





+￿, as d2FB < W
2+￿1+￿2. At the laissez-faire,





+ ￿, as d2LF < W
2(1+￿2). Given that ￿1 < ￿2,
we have W
2+￿1+￿2 > W
2(1+￿2). Here again, we cannot conclude on whether the inequality is
raised or reduced by utilitarianism.





that we can say for sure that
utilitarianism reduces inequalities between short-lived and long-lived within type-1 agents,
and does the opposite for type-2 agents.





, the di⁄erence in lifetime welfare between long-lived and short-





+￿, as d1FB >
W





+ ￿, as d1LF >
W
2(1+￿1). Given that ￿1 < ￿2, we have W
2+￿1+￿2 < W
2(1+￿1), but here again one cannot draw
conclusions on how utilitarianism a⁄ects inequalities within type-1 agents. The same is true
for type-2 agents.
7.10 Proof of Proposition 10
Take the case where G00(￿) = 0. From the FOCs, we have:
u0(c1) = u0(c2)
u0(c1) = u0(d1 + ￿1)
u0(c2) = u0(d2 + ￿2)
u0(d1 + ￿1) = u0(d2 + ￿2)
46from which it is trivial to see that, under ￿i > 0, c1 = d1 + ￿1, c2 = d2 + ￿2, and c1 = c2.
Substituting for all this in the economy￿ s resource constraint yields the solutions in the
Proposition.
Take now the case where G00(￿) < 0, and focus on the case where ￿i > 0.
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+ u(di + ￿i)
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2+￿1+￿2 < di. Then, under ￿i > 0, u0(ci) > u0(di + ￿i).

















+ u(di + ￿i)
￿
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+ u(di + ￿i)
￿
u0(di + ￿i), in contradiction with the FOCs. Hence it must be the





2+￿1+￿2 > di. Therefore we have c1 > d1 and c2 > d2. Hence 6 rankings
are possible:
d2 < c2 < d1 < c1;d1 < c1 < d2 < c2
d2 < d1 < c2 < c1;d1 < d2 < c1 < c2
d1 < d2 < c2 < c1;d2 < d1 < c1 < c2
Note, however, that we have di < cj.52 Hence we can eliminate the rankings d2 < c2 <
d1 < c1 and d1 < c1 < d2 < c2. However, it is not possible to eliminate the others, since the
two types of agents have distinct consumption-equivalents ￿1 and ￿2. We are left with four
rankings: d2 < d1 < c2 < c1, d1 < d2 < c1 < c2, d1 < d2 < c2 < c1 or d2 < d1 < c1 < c2.



























2+￿1+￿2 in the FOCs, we get:
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿1￿
G0 (0) + ￿1G0 (0)
￿
u0(c1) = G0 (0)u0(d1 + ￿1)
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿2￿
G0 (u(0)) + ￿2G0 (0)
￿
u0(c2) = G0 (0))u0(d2 + ￿2)

















2+￿1+￿2 is the solution of the planning problem, as this satis￿es the FOCs.




















2+￿1+￿2 < ci. From the ￿rst FOC we have
52Indeed ci > W+￿1￿1+￿2￿2
2+￿1+￿2 > di is true for all i, so that it is also true that ci > dj.
47￿
￿iG0 ￿








u0(ci) = ￿. From the second FOC we
have u0(di + ￿i)G0 ￿
u(ci) + u(di + ￿i)
￿
= ￿. However, it is easy to see that there must be









, we have u(ci) + u(di + ￿i) < u(ci).
Hence G0 ￿
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2+￿1+￿2 < ci, we have also u0(ci) < u0(di + ￿i). Hence it must be the case that
￿
￿iG0 ￿








u0(ci) < u0(di + ￿i)G0 ￿
u(ci) + u(di + ￿i)
￿
.
Therefore, given that the LHS and the RHS of that expression are equal to ￿, a contradiction





2+￿1+￿2 < di. Therefore we have c1 < d1 and c2 < d2.
Hence 6 rankings are possible:
c2 < d2 < c1 < d1;c1 < d1 < c2 < d2
c2 < c1 < d2 < d1;c1 < c2 < d1 < d2
c1 < c2 < d2 < d1;c2 < c1 < d1 < d2
By using the same kind of proof as above, we can rule out the ￿rst two rankings by
contradiction, and thus we keep c2 < c1 < d2 < d1, c1 < c2 < d1 < d2, c1 < c2 < d2 < d1
and c2 < c1 < d1 < d2.
7.11 Calibration of ￿ under G00(￿) = 0
Regarding the calibration of the intercept ￿ under G00(￿) = 0, note ￿rst that the value of






















when consumption is smoothed across periods and where w is the initial wealth.
The value of life can be interpreted as the amount of wealth the agent is willing to give up







































48Assuming that the initial endowment equals 10 and that consumption is smoothed across
periods, the VSL is









Given that the VSL amounts to about 120 times income per head per year (see Miller,
2001), which amounts to 120
40 income per period of 40 years, we have, given the two-period
structure, V L(5) = 120
40 (5) = 15, from which it follows that ￿ = 4:472.
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